Johnson: Cashman Recent Transaction Patterns = Success
Matt Johnson (aka mehmattski) has decided to pitch in on the Cashman Appreciation Project. What follows below is Matt’s own words. Thanks to Matt for sharing this content with WasWatching.com!
Success for a baseball general manager should not be defined by creating a scorecard of all positive and negative deals, signings, and drafts; it should be measured on the basis of creating and executing a plan that builds a sustainable, winning franchise. Individual transactions should not be judged by their results but by their context- what was the players’ value at the time of the transaction? What other teams were interested? What were the Yankees other options at that time? Most of all, the question should be: did a particular transaction match the specific needs and overall plan of the organization? It should be argued that the worst transactions of all are the ones made simply for the sake of making transactions, and have no bearing on the overall scheme of the franchise. There are a few ways, then, to analyze the contributions of Brian Cashman to the New York Yankees. One way would be to look at transaction patterns relative to his peers; this would be a worthy, if lengthy exercise, but important because as stats like RSAA and OPS+ have told us, relative success is just as important as absolute success.
However, the following is an exploration of the greater pattern behind Brian Cashman’s actions at the helm of the New York Yankees since Cashman signed his new contract in the 2005 off-season. With this contract, Cashman was given a promise that the team would be more in his control, insinuating that deals prior to 2005 did not have the support of the full front office. The 2005 season represents a turning point in the Yankees’ “success,” ending a period where they were one out away from winning their third pennant in four years, and beginning a period with multiple first-round playoff losses, but also a period with a distinct change in strategy. This change can be summed up with one annual event, previously ignored by the Yankees: the June Amateur Player Draft.
As noted here on August 30, 2007, Cashman decided to let Damon Oppenheimer have control over draft selections beginning in 2006. Still, Cashman attended the 2006 draft (and chose it over watching a Yankees-Red Sox game). Either way, both Cashman and Oppenheimer were clearly involved in previous drafts, which have so far yielded fairly good results: from 2005, JB Cox, Zach Kroenke, Brett Gardner, Austin Jackson, Garrett Patterson, and Alan Horne were all selected in the first dozen rounds. The year before, the Yankees had used compensation picks on Phil Hughes and Jeff Marquez but otherwise had a fairly boring draft. In each of those years the Yankees did have a first round pick, but not the one originally assigned to them; in 2004 it was compensation for Jon Leiber, who despite not pitching at all in 2003 was granted Type A status; in 2005, only the surprise defection of Andy Pettitte granted the Yankees a first round pick, while the Yankees’ pick went to the Marlins for Carl Pavano. Before 2004, the Yankees’ farm system was woefully barren, most trade talks stalled as a result, and the efforts of 2005 were only beginning to help.
The 2006 Amateur draft was different; while the Yankees gave up their own pick to Boston in exchange for Johnny Damon, their compensation pick was likely one of design- Tom Gordon was not re-signed, and the Yankees received the #21 overall pick and a supplemental round pick. With these two selections came Ian Kennedy and Joba Chamberlain. The rest of the draft is a cast of prospects familiar because of their discussion in trade talks: Zach McAllister, Dellin Betances, Mitch Hilligoss, and Dan McCutchen. One thing that has become a clear pattern for the Yankees is a willingness to dedicate their substantial wealth to signing prospects above-slot and prying them away from college commitments. This is easily seen in the 2007 draft, with the selection and subsequent signing bonuses for Andrew Brackman, Austin Romine, Brad Suttle, and Carmen Angellini.
This pattern of rededicating efforts towards building the franchise from within began in 2004 and has crystallized for the Yankees in 2007. What has to remain abundantly clear is the dedication to the plan not just from Oppenheimer, but also from Cashman. It would not be possible for the Yankees to be so successful in drafting players recently had Cashman grabbed every free agent player he could find, regardless of their draft-pick penalty. Multiple times this offseason, Cashman has mentioned draft picks and has been wary of free agents with the penalty attached– the Luis Vizcaino/LaTroy Hawkins swap seems proof that the supplemental pick in 2008 is important to Cashman. The dedication to youth can be seen in other avenues as well- the flurry of trades engineered by Cashman in the 2006 off-season brought the Yankees even more youthful depth with Ross Ohlendorf, Steven Jackson, Chris Britton, Alberto Gonzales, Keven Whelan, and, eventually, Humberto Sanchez.
Finally, and most effectively, the Yankees have been major players with international signings, with the resources not only to outbid but also to out-scout other teams in Latin America. This is, of course, not a recent development, and has resulted in Jorge Posada, Bernie Williams, Mariano Rivera, Robinson Cano, Melky Cabrera; and in the minors there are Jose Tabata, Jesus Montero, and Marcos Vechionacci. The Yankees, in 2007, announced that they will be the first to heavily recruit players from China- while the first prospects may not amount to much, it represents outside-the-box thinking and a dedication to the Far East which has netted clear winners like Chien-Ming Wang and Hideki Matsui.
In the last few weeks, we’ve seen the battle within the Yankees organization rear its ugly head once again, represented in microcosm by debate on the Johan Santana trade. On one hand is the obsession with winning, every year, at all costs; on the other, a commitment to improving the long-term success of the franchise. Phil Hughes, for whatever his strength and weaknesses, represents this commitment and a hopeful look forward to a day when the Yankees are a team built from within. The reluctance to trade Hughes, even for the best pitcher in baseball during the middle of his prime, is symbolic of a pattern that has taken over the entire Yankees front office over the past few years. While both credit and blame should be levied carefully, in the end it is the responsibility of the general manager to decide whether to take the advice of Damon Oppenheimer or Randy Levine.
The conclusion that should be drawn from the above evidence is that a commitment to rebuilding the farm system has to be engineered through all levels of the front office: there have to be very few high-impact free agent signings to keep draft picks; those draft picks have to be well scouted; and the Yankees are willing leverage their resources to pay high signing bonuses to draft picks and international players. No one person is responsible for keeping all of those plans in working order, but one man is in charge of organizing the efforts of those responsible for amateur drafts, international scouting, and personnel decisions: Brian Cashman. So while others would be content to debate the fine details of every transaction the Yankees have made in the last ten years, a better judge of Cashman’s influence over the Yankees’ organization is elucidated from his recent transaction patterns. The point is to make the team younger, more talented, and sustainable for longer than with the previous strategy of signing aging veterans. For this dedication, Brian Cashman’s latest contract (since October 2005) has to be judged as a success.
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Post-script: Additional reader comments on this can be found at BaseballThinkFactory.org
Very nice job, Matt. I like the way that you kept the essay focused on the post-2005 Yankees and, within that, their new found focus on the amateur draft.
Why it took the Yankees so long to realize that the June draft was important is a mystery to me. All I can guess it that Steinbrenner’s impatience and free-spending on the major league level led the Yankees to behave in a “penny-wise, pound-foolish” manner.
Arguably, this is the first time since the draft was instituted in 1965 that the Yankees have treated it as important; that is indeed a hopeful sign for the future.
Thanks for taking the time out to write this… It isn’t as easy as Steve makes it look, eh?
Good stuff Matt.
Just one thing…when you say “What other teams were interested?” in the first paragraph, I have to quarrel with that methodology. As in the case of Carl Pavano, people often say “but Boston and Seattle both wanted him too.” I don’t see how this is relevant. The Yanks should’ve seen him for what he was and the presence of other suitors only means that “the masses are asses” as the saying goes.
Otherwise, I’m on board with your essay and agree with you.
Thanks for the kind words guys!
jonm- I think people who discount the “since 2005″ barometer for Cashman forget that it was impossible to build a farm system with the free-agent signings bleeding draft picks. Simply “building a farm system” required an organization-wide change.
Raf- no, it’s definitely not easy. As you can see from my mostly defunct blog, it’s really hard to come up with interesting things to say every day. While we may not agree with some of what Steve has to say, he’s got a voice and has a place for those opinions to be aired. For that he should be admired.
MJ- I may have not fleshed that idea out too much, but what I was getting was this: what if, like players with RSAA and OPS+, general managers were measured in relation to their peers. In doing so, we would have to look at the actions of other general managers to determine a context for each signing. In the context of Carl Pavano’s signing: how much was the contract the result of fulfilling a need and following a plan? How did the presence of other teams in the bidding affect decision-making? On one level, other teams being interested in Pavano at least absolves Cashman of SOME blame, since relative to league context he wasn’t doing anything out of the ordinary pursuing him.
On the other hand, I think if this kind of analysis were done, it would show that Cashman’s strengths lie in taking risks on players that no other GM has even thought about (see Leiber, Jon). When other teams get involved, the deals tend to be bloated and hurt the Yankees in the long run. Cashman’s reign has been marked by success coming from nowhere that anyone would have predicted (A-Rod trade, Abreu trade, Chein-Ming Wang).
Nice article…I agree that Cashman’s most important contribution to the Yankees has been realizing that the Yankees reign of success would come to an end if a new approach (besides using FA patches to supplement a declining core) wasn’t followed.
I think, however, that Cashman’s contribution goes far beyond that. As you touched upon in your post, Cashman has shown an ability to pull a rabbit out of a hat. In addition to the names you mentioned, I am also thinking about the Dave Justice deal (which one a championship) and the acquisitions of guys like Small and Chacon (which won a division). Also, you could even argue that the Proctor deal was a big one because outside of Mo, EDSP was the only realiable reliever we had. Those 100 quality innings not only helped the Yankees have a successful season, but also saved added wear and tear on Mariano. Other key pick-ups off the top of my head include Knoblauch, Brosius and Clemens (the first time).
Finally, Cashman has proven to be relatively flexible. The best example of that was in early 2005 when the Yankees pulled the plug on Womack and dedicated themselves to giving Cano and Wang a chance. We also saw that this year…promoting Hughes, Chamberlain, Edwar and Kennedy showed Cashman’s continued willingness to trust youth in a penant race.
Is Cashman perfect? No. Could he do a better job with the bullpen and bench? Perhaps (although I think every team could say that about its GM). On the whole, I am glad Cashman is the GM and hope the Yankees sign him to an extension before he gets any thoughts about moving elsewhere.